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Most existing work in digital ethics is modeled on the “principlist” approach to
medical ethics, seeking to articulate a small set of general principles to guide ethical
decision-making. Critics have highlighted several limitations of such principles, including
(1) that they mask ethical disagreements between and within stakeholder communities,
and (2) that they provide little guidance for how to resolve trade-offs between different
values. This paper argues that efforts to develop responsible digital health practices
could benefit from paying closer attention to a different branch of medical ethics,
namely public health ethics. In particular, I argue that the influential “accountability for
reasonableness” (A4R) approach to public health ethics can help overcome some of the
limitations of existing digital ethics principles. A4R seeks to resolve trade-offs through
decision-procedures designed according to certain shared procedural values. This allows
stakeholders to recognize decisions reached through these procedures as legitimate,
despite their underlying disagreements. I discuss the prospects for adapting A4R to the
context of responsible digital health and suggest questions for further research.
Keywords: digital ethics, principlism, public health ethics, procedural values, accountability for reasonableness,
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INTRODUCTION
Recent years have seen a proliferation of digital ethics guidelines. There now exist more than 160
such guidelines, the vast majority published within the last 5 years by a wide range of institutions,
including governments, legislative bodies, technology companies, and academic and professional
organizations (1). These guidelines are intended for a number of purposes, including as a guide for
designers of new digital technologies, to identify and address issues arising from the deployment of
such technologies, and as a basis for developing standards and regulation (2).
Many seeking to bring analytical clarity to this panoply have looked to medical ethics for
inspiration (3, 4). This is unsurprising: medical ethics is perhaps the most well-established field
of practical ethics, both within academic research and as a framework for practitioners. For digital
health technologies there is of course the additional reason that they are designed to become part of
medical practice. Responsible digital health should involve being held to the same ethical standards
as any other form of medical practice (5).
Most of this work has been modeled on an approach to medical ethics known as “principlism.”
Principlism seeks to articulate a small set of general principles to guide ethical decision-making.
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Most influentially, Tom Beauchamp & James Childress’
four Principles of Biomedical Ethics (6)—Beneficence, Non-
Maleficence, Autonomy and Justice—are widely used and taught
within clinical practice and research ethics. Many reviews
of digital ethics guidelines similarly seek to subsume their
recommendations under a small set of general principles, and
some explicitly use Beauchamp & Childress’ four principles
(sometimes with a new fifth principle of Explicability) (3, 7–
10). The convergence on these principles is often touted as
evidence of an emerging consensus which can serve as a basis for
implementing ethics into the design, regulation, and application
of digital technologies. Yet how this is to be done largely remains
an open question (11). Consequently, digital ethicists have
increasingly turned their attention to how such principles can
best be translated into practice, whether through new design
practices (5, 12, 13) or new forms of legislation and regulation
(14, 15).
However, critics have highlighted several limitations which
vitiate the practical applicability of this approach to digital ethics
(2, 9, 16–18). In this paper, I focus on two in particular. First,
principles formulated in general, abstract terms mask underlying
disagreements between and within stakeholder communities.
Second, they provide little guidance for how to resolve tensions
and trade-offs that can arise between different (interpretations
of) principles. To overcome these limitations, I argue, efforts
to develop more responsible digital health practices should pay
closer attention to a different branch of medical ethics: public
health ethics.
I start by making a general case for this claim. I then discuss
the problems of disagreement and trade-offs within digital ethics,
before introducing an influential account from public health
ethics of how to reach ethically legitimate compromises on
value-laden trade-offs. This approach, known as accountability
for reasonableness (A4R) is based on the idea that legitimate
compromises can be reached through decision-procedures
designed according to certain procedural values (19). Finally, I
discuss the prospects for adapting this approach to digital health
and propose some questions for future research.
WHY PUBLIC HEALTH ETHICS?
Public health differs from clinical practice in two key respects
(20): in who is affected, and in who decides and implements
interventions. Public health interventions affect broader
populations, rather than specific, identifiable patients, and they
are largely decided and implemented by institutional actors
(e.g., governments, insurance companies, NGOs), rather than
individual clinicians/researchers.
There are two general reasons why closer attention to public
health ethics is likely to benefit efforts to develop responsible
digital health.
First, digital health technologies are often similar to public
health interventions. Some are explicitly designed for public
health purposes, such as monitoring infectious disease outbreaks
(21, 22) or discovering risk factors for childhood obesity (23).
But many digital technologies deployed in clinical settings also
resemble public health interventions. Take machine learning
tools for diagnostic decision-support (24, 25). These are usually
designed for screening purposes, to monitor data from a given
patient population and flag risk factors to human clinicians,
and decisions to deploy them are made at the institutional level
(e.g., hospitals or health service trusts). Even in patient-facing
applications, e.g., conversational agents to assist with lifestyle
decisions (26), many of the pertinent ethical decisions have to
be made at the population/institutional level—by designers and
regulators—rather than in the individual clinical encounter.
The second reason follows from the first. Due to its focus on
population/institution-level interventions, public health ethics
mainly addresses questions of political morality rather than the
ethics of the individual patient-clinician relationship (20). It
therefore provides a promising resource for addressing important
political issues that arise from digital health.
Recent digital ethics has mostly focused on technological
deficiencies and solutions, such as algorithmic bias and
transparency. As several commentators have highlighted, this
risks occluding broader social and political issues relating, e.g.,
to democratic oversight, power, and oppression (27–33). For
example, it was recently shown that an algorithm that uses
healthcare costs as a proxy for healthcare needs systematically
underestimated the needs of Black patients, because less
resources are already spent on their care (34). Ruha Benjamin
(35) argues that labeling this “algorithmic bias,” makes it seem
a purely technical issue and sanitizes the social context that
produced the problem in the first place, namely persistent
structural and interpersonal racism in healthcare.More generally,
as Leila Marie Hampton (30) argues, using generic concepts such
as “fairness” or “transparency” to analyze technologies, without
considering broader socio-political issues, risks legitimizing, and
entrenching fundamentally unjust institutions.
While the Four Principles do include a principle of Justice,
political issues covered under this heading mainly concern the
question of what health-related goods society should provide and
how to allocate resources within healthcare systems (5, chapter
6). By contrast, public health interventions raise a much wider
set of political issues (20), similar to those commentators have
started to discuss for digital health. For instance, is it permissible
for interventions to impose risks or burdens on some individuals,
even if they are not the main beneficiaries (e.g., mandatory
vaccination programs)? Is it justifiable for interventions to exploit
or reinforce structural patterns of disadvantage (e.g., using
the communicative power of the state to stigmatize smoking)?
More generally, when can institutional actors legitimately impose
interventions despite widespread disagreement about relevant
ethical values?
To be clear, my aim is not to reject the Four Principles
framework or other principlist approaches to digital ethics. Such
principles still serve a useful purpose in articulating the values
at stake in digital ethics (cf. Section What rationales should be
considered relevant?). Similarly, public health ethics will not,
in itself, answer all of the socio-political issues that Benjamin,
Hampton and others raise. Clearly, many of these require
political action and structural change, not (just) better theory.
Even in terms of theory, other literatures will be relevant too,
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especially emancipatory philosophies such as the Black Feminist
tradition Hampton highlights. Nonetheless, public health ethics
is a well-developed literature addressing practical political issues
in healthcare, often closely informed by the empirical realities of
healthcare policy and decision-making. It can thus help broaden
the range of questions digital health ethics addresses.
DISAGREEMENT, TRADE-OFFS, AND THE
LIMITS OF PRINCIPLES
The rest of this paper will focus on how insights from public
health ethics can help overcome the two limitations of purely
principlist approaches to digital ethics I highlighted in the
introduction, i.e., that they mask disagreements between and
within different stakeholder communities and provide little
guidance for how to resolve trade-offs.
Consider for example debates about contact tracing apps for
the management of Covid-19. Some governments wanted to base
these on a centralized data collection approach, arguing that
such datasets could also be used to produce new knowledge
to help combat the pandemic. This was resisted by legal and
information security experts concerned about potential privacy
breaches (36–38). Appealing to general principles is unlikely
to resolve this debate. While most people would presumably
agree, say, that digital health technologies should be used to “do
good” (Beneficence), there are legitimate ethical and political
disagreements about the extent to which privacy is constitutive
of or conducive to a good life. While we should arguably
accept some trade-offs between protecting individual privacy and
promoting social goods, there is little consensus on what exactly
those trade-offs should be (38).
The prevalent approach to managing value trade-offs within
clinical ethics is through informed consent (5, chapter 3):
by informing patients about the trade-off involved in some
treatment and letting them decide whether this is acceptable in
light of their particular circumstances and values, clinicians can
legitimize the decision to administer or withhold the treatment.
It might be tempting to apply the same approach to digital health.
However, informed consent is only plausible when the trade-
offs occur within a single patient’s value-set. One of the ways
digital health resembles public health is that the trade-offs often
cut across populations. Rather than each patient deciding for
themselves how to balance trade-offs, which values get priority
depends on population-level aggregate decisions. Contact tracing
apps, and centralized data collection more generally, can only
produce the relevant social goods if there is sufficient uptake
(39). Conversely, if enough people consent to share their personal
data, this can often be used to train machine learning algorithms
capable of inferring highly personal information even about those
who withhold consent (40).
In such cases, making interventions conditional on obtaining
everyone’s consent is neither practically feasible nor ethically
plausible. A single intransigent individual should not be allowed
to deprive everyone else of significant social goods. However,
pure majority rule is not plausible either. Certain groups and
communities may have good reasons, e.g., to value privacy
because of their historical experiences of surveillance and
discrimination (37). For instance, during the 1980’s AIDS
crisis, gay community-based activists initially resisted name-
based reporting of infections, arguing that homophobia and
AIDS-hysteria made privacy breaches and discrimination against
people identified as HIV-positive more likely than for other
diseases (41). Even if such reasons should not necessarily be
decisive, collective decision-making should at least be responsive
to them, and not just defer to majority preferences.
LEGITIMACY THROUGH PROCEDURAL
VALUES
How to resolve disagreement and trade-offs is a characteristic
conundrum in public health ethics. For example, in debates about
priority setting and rationing of healthcare resources, ethicists
have found it difficult to formulate ethical principles that are
plausible enough to command broad consensus while being
sufficiently fine-grained to guide decision-making in practice
(42, 43). While many agree that those with greater needs should
be given some priority, even at the expense of aggregate health
outcomes, there is little consensus on how to weigh these two
concerns against each other.
One influential model for resolving disagreements about
priority setting in public health is called Accountability for
Reasonableness (A4R) (19, 44, 45). Proposed by Norman Daniels
and James Sabin, the key idea in A4R is to implement decision-
procedures for reaching compromises which fair-minded people
can accept as legitimate, despite their underlying ethical
disagreements. This relies on a distinction between ethical
rightness and ethical legitimacy. To regard a decision as right is
to regard it as the morally correct thing to do in a given situation.
To regard it as legitimate is to regard it as appropriately made,
i.e., by a decision-maker or procedure whose moral authority to
make such decisions should be accepted. The two can come apart:
we can accept a verdict of “not guilty” in a fair trial as legitimate,
even if we believe the defendant should have been convicted.
Conversely, an unelected dictator may sometimes do the right
thing, e.g., donate food to relieve a famine. Nonetheless, rightness
and legitimacy are also entangled: if a procedure consistently
generates abhorrent outcomes, we have reason to question its
legitimacy; and if we can see that a decision-maker has carefully
considered the relevant concerns, there is prima facie reason to
accept their decision as right.
Daniels and Sabin propose four conditions for legitimate
decision-procedures (44, 45):
1. Publicity: The rationale for a given decision must be
publicly accessible.
2. Relevance: Decisions must be based on rationales which fair-
minded individuals, who want to find mutually justifiable
terms of cooperation, would accept as relevant to the decision.
3. Revision and Appeals: There must be mechanisms in place for
challenging and revising decisions in light of new evidence
or arguments.
4. Enforcement: There must be voluntary or public regulation in
place to ensure that conditions 1–3 are met.
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These conditions can be interpreted as embodying certain
procedural values, specifying features that fair and appropriate
decision procedures should have. It is a shared commitment to
procedural values that generates legitimacy. Stakeholders who
agree on these values have good reasons to regard procedures
designed according to them as legitimate.
As the name suggests, the core procedural values in
A4R are Accountability and Reasonableness. By articulating
standards and mechanisms that stakeholders can use to hold
decision-makers accountable—through enforceable rights to
access rationales and challenge decisions—A4R aims to produce
decisions that are reasonable, and can be recognized as such.
Reasonableness here means something weaker than rightness:
a decision is reasonable to the extent that it is responsive
to all relevant concerns. Thus, if you recognize a decision as
reasonable you may disagree about the specific way decision-
makers weighed the reasons cited in their rationale, but you agree
that it involved the right kinds of considerations.
The A4R conditions are supposed to guide the design of
decision-making bodies charged with deciding how to balance
any trade-offs that arise within a given healthcare institution
(e.g., a hospital, public health agency or insurance company).
Decision-makers should strive to identify compromises which
all fair-minded stakeholders could find acceptable, though, some
form of voting may be used if disagreement persists at the end
of deliberation. Importantly, decision-makers do not need to
articulate any general hierarchy of values or “meta-principles”
for resolving trade-offs. Indeed, one of the motivations behind
A4R is that we are unlikely to agree on any sufficiently action-
guiding meta-principles. Rather, it aims to resolve trade-offs on
a case-by-case basis as they arise in practice, based on rationales
stakeholders will find contextually reasonable, despite persistent
disagreement about general principles.
A4R is not without its detractors (little in philosophy is), nor is
it the only account in public health ethics of how to resolve trade-
offs (20). Nonetheless, it is a highly influential framework which
has been used to inform public health practice (46, 47) and whose
acceptability to decision-makers has been studied empirically
across the world (48–50). Furthermore, public health ethicists
have proposed a number of revisions and extensions of the A4R
framework, reflecting lessons from these practical applications
(51–54). As such, the A4R literature is likely to contain valuable
lessons for responsible digital health1.
ADAPTING A4R TO DIGITAL HEALTH
In the Introduction I highlighted two routes that ethicists
have proposed for translating existing principles into practice:
legislation/regulation and design practices. A4R can help
overcome some of the limitations of the principlist approach
within each of these.
Regarding the first, the challenge is to translate abstract
general principles into more concrete legislation and regulation
while still preserving their broad appeal. However, attempts to
1To my knowledge, only two other recent papers have discussed the application of
A4R to digital (health) ethics (33, 55), though not along the same lines as me.
make principles more concrete and action-guiding, including
any meta-principles for resolving trade-offs, will likely also make
them more controversial. The A4R framework provides an
alternative solution: rather than having to settle on a specific
action-guiding translation of principles, legislators can instead
specify how organizations that deploy or design digital health
technologies should structure the decision-making processes
through which they resolve any trade-offs they encounter.
As mentioned, deliberative bodies based on the A4R
conditions have already been implemented in some healthcare
institutions to address issues of priority setting and rationing.
The remit of these could be expanded to also address the broader
range of trade-offs that arise from the deployment of digital
health technologies. Legislators could also require decision-
making bodies modeled on the existing ones to be created
elsewhere, including within private technology companies or as
part of regulators charged with overseeing them.
Whether legally required or voluntarily adopted, this type of
deliberative body could also provide a way to deal with trade-offs
in the design of digital health technologies. A common criticism
of Value-Sensitive Design (VSD) is that it lacks a method for
resolving trade-offs, except if designers commit to an explicit
– and therefore likely controversial – ethical theory (56, 57).
This challenge will also affect proposals to implement digital
ethics principles through (a modified version of) VSD (12). A4R
suggests a way to overcome it: by structuring their decision-
making processes according to the right kinds of procedural
values, designers will be able to reach decisions that stakeholders
can recognize as legitimate and therefore acceptable. To be clear,
A4R is a normative theory of legitimacy. It does not commit the
naturalistic fallacy by assuming that whatever stakeholders find
acceptable is therefore right. If a decision counts as legitimate,
according to A4R, stakeholders ought to find it acceptable.
FUTURE RESEARCH QUESTIONS
There are of course many details to be worked out regarding
the proposals sketched here. How to best implement and
operationalize them in practice remains an important question
for future research. Part of this will practical, but A4R also
provides a philosophically grounded theory to underpin this
research and ensure that proposed implementations remain
normatively plausible.
However, we should not expect that A4R can simply be
transposed from its original application (priority setting and
rationing) to digital health without modification. Adapting A4R
to digital health will likely require modifications or extensions
to the framework itself. At least two kinds of further research
questions will be relevant to explore.
Are Other Procedural Values Needed?
One of the ways public health ethicists have extended the original
A4R framework is by adding further procedural values, often
motivated by their practical experience of applying A4R to
priority setting decisions. For instance, some have proposed
new conditions of Inclusiveness and Empowerment. In brief,
these require explicit input from all affected stakeholders and
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that active steps are taken to counteract knowledge-gaps and
institutional power differences between decision-makers (33, 53,
58). Importantly, these conditions are still motivated by the core
value of Reasonableness, namely to ensure that decision-makers
are responsive to asmany relevant concerns as possible, including
those that are held by minoritized or less empowered parts of
the population.
Applying A4R to digital health may similarly reveal new
procedural values. For instance, if Benjamin and Hampton
are correct that ethical discussions of digital technologies risk
sanitizing and entrenching unjust social structures, it may be
necessary to actively encourage decision-makers to raise critical
questions about how new technologies will interact with these
structures. Similarly, it may be necessary to encourage scrutiny
of the aims and presuppositions of the technology itself, asking
for example whether it targets the right problem or whether the
proposed solution is at all appropriate. We might summarize
these as a condition of Socio-Technological Criticism.
What Rationales Should Be Considered
Relevant?
The Relevance condition is a formal constraint on the type of
rationales that should be given weight within decision-making.
However, implementing A4R in practice requires us to specify
in more substantive terms what types of concerns should be
admissible. This will likely depend on the context of application.
As A4R was originally developed for debates about rationing,
most discussions focus on rationales framed in terms of Fairness
or related distributive values (e.g., Solidarity (52)). Presumably,
a broader range of values will be relevant to debates about
digital health technologies (e.g., Privacy). Exploring in more
detail what those values should be is a substantive research task.
To ensure that decision-makers are responsive to all relevant
reasons, this research should aim to identify a broad range of
plausible concerns and help elucidate and articulate these, so
that stakeholders can present them in their most compelling
form. Existing VSD methodologies for empirical and conceptual
investigations of stakeholder values provide a plausible approach
to this task.
Existing principlist approaches to digital ethics provide
a useful starting point. However, the values discussed in
the existing literature should not be assumed exhaustive or
representative. The apparent convergence found heremay simply
be a product of people from roughly similar backgrounds
consuming the same literature (2, 17). It is noticeable,
for instance, that many commonly cited principles (e.g.,
transparency, fairness, responsibility) also feature prominently
within liberal political philosophy. Values more characteristic
of other political traditions, such as solidarity, belonging,
authenticity, harmony, non-exploitation, non-domination or
emancipation are rarely discussed or even mentioned (9, 29,
30). Public health ethics may also here provide a useful
resource. Public health ethicists have developed alternative sets
of principles to the four classical principles of biomedical
ethics (59), and explored the implications of different political
traditions (60).
CONCLUSION
Paying closer attention to public health ethics is likely to
benefit efforts to develop responsible digital health. In
this paper, I have made a general case for this claim and
highlighted A4R as a specific model from public health ethics
that can be adapted to digital health. While not intended
to wholly replace principlism, A4R can complement and
help overcome some of the limitations faced by principlist
approaches. Further, research on the questions outlined above
could generate valuable insights for the ethical deployment,
design and regulation of digital technologies, especially
within healthcare.
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